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Modelling dependence probabilistically is crucial for many applications in risk assessment
and decision making under uncertainty. Neglecting dependence between multivariate uncertain-
ties can distort model output and prevent a proper understanding of the overall risk. Whenever
relevant data for quantifying and modelling dependence between uncertain variables is lacking,
expert judgement might be sought to assess a joint distribution. Key challenges for the use
of expert judgement for dependence modelling are over- and underspecification. An expert
can sometimes provide assessments which are not consistent with any probability distribution
(overspecification), and on the other hand, without making very restrictive parametric assump-
tions an expert cannot fully define a full probability distribution (underspecification). The
Sequential Refined Partitioning method addresses over- and underspecification whilst allowing
for flexibility about which part of a joint distribution is assessed and its level of detail. Potential
overspecification is avoided by ensuring low cognitive complexity for experts through eliciting
single conditioning sets and by offering feasible assessment ranges. The feasible range of any
(sequential) assessment can be derived by solving a linear programming problem. Underspec-
ification is addressed by modelling the density of directly and indirectly assessed distribution
parts as minimally informative given their constraints. Hence, our method allows for modelling
the whole distribution feasibly and in accordance with experts’ information. A non-parametric
way of assessing and modelling dependence flexibly in such detail has not been presented in the
expert judgement literature for probabilistic dependence models so far. We provide an example
of assessing terrorism risk in insurance underwriting.
Keywords: Structured Expert Judgement, Dependence Modelling, Minimum Information, Terror-
ism Risk, Uncertainty Modelling, Risk Analysis
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In many risk and decision analysis problems, we need to quantify uncertainties and their dependence1
as otherwise a model for risk assessment and decision making might not be fit for purpose. Indeed,2
quantifying dependence for probabilistic modelling is listed repeatedly among the most significant3
topics which decision and risk analysis research faces [1, 2]. Therefore, modelling joint distributions4
in various ways and for several problem types is an active research area (e.g. Durante and Sempi5
[3], Hanea et al. [4], McNeil et al. [5], Joe [6], Genest et al. [7], Kurowicka and Cooke [8], Embrechts6
et al. [9]). A common challenge is a lack of relevant data for quantifying dependence models. In such7
cases, this information should be assessed through expert judgements. A structured expert judge-8
ment (SEJ) elicitation is the most sensible solution to missing historical data whenever a simplifying9
assumption, such as independence, is not applicable. Werner et al. [10] and Werner et al. [11] discuss10
expert judgement methods for dependence in more detail. The former outlines how it is used for11
several dependence models and reviews commonly elicited forms together with their implication on12
experts’ cognitive burden. The latter presents the main steps of structured dependence elicitations13
and reviews the most prevalent cognitive fallacies for assessing dependence as their mitigation is a14
main aim of structured processes. Most applications discussed in these reviews are based on Cooke15
and Goossens [12, 13] which are among the first guides on SEJ procedures for dependence. Both16
guides are of further relevance for this paper as they consider in particular the elicitation of condi-17
tional exceedance probabilities, an elicited form we will address in more detail later. In this paper,18
we focus mainly on the process for quantitative elicitation, though we do discuss an approach to19
structuring experts’ knowledge prior to elicitation in the illustrative example of section 4.20
For us, dependence means that multiple uncertainties are present and obtaining information about21
one changes the uncertainty assessment of the other(s). More specifically, we consider the bivariate22
dependence between two random variables X and Y with joint distribution function FX,Y (x, y) and23
marginal distributions FX(x) and FY (y). The variables are independent if the assessment of Y does24
not change when given information about X. Dependence is simply the absence of independence. It25
is a property of experts’ knowledge (and beliefs) and its definition falls therefore into the subjective26
probability context as in line with De Finetti [14],Savage [15] and Ramsey [16].27
We address the problem that experts can only ever assess certain aspects of a joint distribution28
whereas a decision-maker might desire these assessments to be made at a detailed level. The former29
implies that we have a partially unknown distribution for which various alternatives fit the given30
information. This is known as model underspecification. More specifically, we are only ever given the31
probability mass (or density) within some distribution parts, either through their direct assessment32
or (in parts which are never assessed) through the indirect result of these parts together with re-33
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lated assessed parts having to comply with the marginals. However, we can model these probability34
masses in various forms which all have the right amount (i.e. are feasible). Of course, we might elicit35
additional information from experts to distinguish between distributions, yet we need to acknowl-36
edge the impossibility of ever eliciting enough information to single out a unique distribution. This37
is unless adopting a low-dimensional parametric model early on in the modelling process1. Such38
parametric assumptions nevertheless restrict the obtained knowledge on dependencies and we might39
miss potentially important model aspects, such as random variables’ behaviour in the extreme parts40
(tails) of a joint distribution. Hence, it is often desirable to avoid distributional assumptions which41
might exclude phenomena that the expert thinks are important.42
Within a non-parametric setting, an elicitation should capture detailed distribution features, e.g.43
the probability mass within narrowly defined parts of the distribution, such as the tails to determine44
tail dependence, as they result in a more specific distribution, thus making the model more valuable45
for a decision-maker. Nevertheless, while detailed assessments might be desired by decision-makers,46
they increase the experts’ cognitive burden, potentially resulting in inconsistent and infeasible as-47
sessments. This is termed overspecification, the second modelling challenge that we encounter2.48
As a non-parametric approach, addressing under- and overspecification, we present the sequential49
refined partitioning (SRP) method for assessments that can be made to any level of detail for any50
part of a joint distribution. In the SRP method, we address overspecification through an elicitation51
procedure which never increases the conditioning set to more than one condition and thus main-52
tains a low cognitive complexity. Further, the procedure ensures consistent and feasible assessments53
through explicit guidance on assessments’ feasibility ranges. Underspecifcation is dealt with by al-54
lowing the expert to specify as much detail as is desired and by then determining the density form55
of directly and indirectly assessed parts of the distribution through the unique copula distribution56
that is minimally informative with respect to the independent copula and that corresponds to the57
elicited information. This makes only the weak assumption that in the absence of any specific guid-58
ance from the expert we should make the copula as close as possible to the independent copula (in59
the sense of minimizing information). This ensures that the whole distribution is in agreement with60
the experts beliefs.61
We note that there may be other situations where a joint distribution is to be defined but data is62
incomplete. For example there may be few data, and/or there may be few or no data in the tails.63
In these cases, we can apply SRP as part of a hybrid method for dependence assessment, so that it64
can also be applied for copula model selection more generally, i.e. in the research area of empirical65
1Under low-dimensional parametric assumptions, it suffices to assess a chosen form’s main parameters. E.g.
eliciting the mean vector and the covariance matrix quantifies a multivariate Gaussian distribution sufficiently.
2Overspecification can also occur with parametric models, e.g. if assessed covariances jointly do not result in a
positive definite matrix.
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The minimum information approach offers a recognised approach to incomplete knowledge[17]. Fur-67
ther, it allows us to stop the elicitation process at any time and still derive a unique distribution68
(in contrast to common probabilistic dependence models for which a full conditional probability69
table is required, e.g. Bayesian (Belief) nets (BNs) [18]). In the context of dependence elicita-70
tion, minimum information methods (and related approaches) have been used before, for instance71
in probabilistic inversion (PI) methods [19, 20, 21, 22], vine-copula quantification [23, 24], or as72
well joint distributions more generally within decision analysis contexts [25, 26, 27, 28]. However,73
these previous methods do not consider flexible nor detailed (e.g. tail) dependence assessments and74
their impact on potential overspecification of experts’ judgements and on the minimum information75
solution to underspecification. For example, Bedford et al. [19] explicitly provide guidance on fea-76
sibility constraints. Yet, they consider dependence elicitation at a rather broad level, eliciting only77
a small number of assessments. This restricts the information to be obtained already early on in78
the modelling process and thus neglects focusing on specific parts of a distribution more exclusively.79
The SRP method’s contribution is therefore that we provide an elicitation procedure to assess any80
part of a distribution to any desired level of detail while maintaining low cognitive complexity and81
avoiding infeasible expert judgements. As such, it also contributes to expert judgement methods82
for dependence in which increasing conditioning sets pose a concern (see Werner et al. [10] for a83
discussion). Similarly, the SRP method’s approach to underspecification is more detailed than in84
previous research.85
These contributions emphasise the applicability of our method in higher dimensions more gener-86
ally. While in this paper we focus on assessing bivariate dependence, it should be noted that any87
d -dimensional copula density can be built through d(d − 1)/2 so-called pair (bivariate) copulas88
through a vine structure [24]. This method of modelling dependence, in conjunction with appropri-89
ate simplifying assumptions, can avoid the curse of dimensionality (see Nagler and Czado [29] for90
using this approach in the context of kernel estimation). In that way, our method can be extended91
to higher dimensions of dependence and be used more generally in the area of multivariate density92
estimation. As such, the SRP method can contribute to more traditional methods of copula esti-93
mation for tail dependence assessment through experts when data on extremes are rare.94
Figure 1 illustrates the method’s modelling context schematically.95
In the upper part, we observe that incomplete knowledge leads inevitably to an underspecified96
model. This is solved by a minimum information approach. In order to derive a model that is97
valuable for a decision-maker, the modelling process deviates along the dashed lines to the lower part.98
Here, the constraints of the minimum information problem determined by the experts’ judgements99
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Figure 1: Modelling context of the SRP method.
are assessed as detailed as desired. As these might be overspecified, we the use an elicitation process100
that leads to feasible assessments. In the remainder of this paper, this is presented in section 2,101
introducing the elicitation procedure, and section 3, outlining the optimisation problem. Section102
4 shows how our method has been us d in an insurance underwriting risk assessment of political103
violence/terrorism in which a detailed and flexible method is of particular interest for stress-testing104
a model. Finally, section 5 concludes the paper.105
2 ELICITING DETAILED DEPENDENCE INFORMATION
FEASIBLY AND CONSISTENTLY THROUGH SEQUEN-
TIAL REFINED PARTITIONING
In this section, we introduce our sequential elicitation procedure which addresses the potential issue106
of overspecification by providing explicit guidance on making feasible and consistent assessments.107
In the expert judgement literature, several approaches to ensuring feasibility and consistency are108
proposed, each with different implications on the robustness of the final assessment result. As such,109
some methods (always) allow for an assessment within the elicited forms’ standard ranges (for corre-110
lation coefficients ∈ [−1, 1] and for conditional and joint probabilities ∈ [0, 1]). However, this might111
jeopardise experts’ commitment and confidence in the elicitation method if assessments are adjusted112
afterwards (for ensuring feasibility). While other methods do not modify assessments, they might113
increase experts’ cognitive complexity. For instance, by limiting assessment ranges (away from the114
aforementioned standard ones), or by imposing unrealistic assumptions onto experts’ understanding115
of elicited forms, e.g. when eliciting conditional judgements with large conditioning sets. For the116
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latter, we might expect an expert to include and equally consider all the information given by a117
large conditioning set so that common cognitive fallacies, such as the conjunction fallacy and its118
conditional version (see Werner et al. [11] for an overview on heuristic and biases in dependence119
assessment), should be (ideally) avoided and hence feasibility is given. Yet, this might not be guar-120
anteed.121
In our method, we do not impose such unrealistic assumptions on experts’ cognitive capabilities, nor122
do we modify assessments after they have been given. Rather, we only ever elicit single conditioning123
sets and give guidance on possible feasible assessment ranges. This includes not only providing the124
corresponding upper and lower bounds but also explaining their interpretation.125
Mathematically, the feasibility range for any sequential assessment procedure is derived by solving126
a linear programming (LP) problem (see Vanderbei [30] for an introduction to LP). The number127
of constraints is restricted to a maximum of nine, irrespective of the number of elicitations. In the128
remainder of this section, we first present the general set-up together with the relevant proofs before129
we outline some specific elicitation sequences, which we regard as of interest for several practical130
applications.131
2.1 General set-up of sequentially refined partitioning132
We shall start by introducing some definitions. The unit square is here defined as the product of133
(0, 1]× (0, 1]. Given values u0 = 0 < u1 < · · · < un < 1 = un+1, and v0 = 0 < v1 < · · · < vm < 1 =134
vm+1, we define the associated quantile partition of the unit square as the set of rectangles of the135
form (ui, ui+1]× (vi, vi+1]. We call this set of rectangles QP (u, v).136
Given (p, q) with p different to the ui and q different to the vj , the (p, q)-refinement of QP (u, v),137
denoted QP (u, v; p, q), is the quantile partition obtained by including p and q in the values for u138
and v respectively. All rectangles in the old partition are either in the new partition or are a union139
of two or four rectangles of the old partition. Figure 2 shows two partitioned example distributions140
which result from any number of previously elicited quantiles (solid lines) in addition to new ones141
(dashed lines).142
A probability distribution on a quantile partition QP (u, v) simply assigns a probability value143
to each rectangle of the quantile partition. A (p, q)-refinement of such a probability distribution is144
a probability distribution on QP (u, v; p, q) such that the probability of a rectangle in QP (u, v) is145
either the same as it is in the (p, q)-refinement of QP (u, v), or it equals the sum of the probabilities146
of the rectangles that make it up.147
A merging of a quantile partition QP (u; v) is obtained by merging together some of the partition148
rectangles in such a way that we still have a quantile partition. This can also be obtained by taking149
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Figure 2: Partition exampleQP (ũ, ṽ; p, q) with solid lines for previously elicited quantiles and dashed
lines for new ones.
a subsequence of the u’s and v’s and building the corresponding quantile partition. A merged prob-150
ability distribution on the refined quantile partition is obtained by adding together the probabilities151
of the rectangles in each refined rectangle.152
We always work with discrete copula distributions, which are probability distributions on a quantile153
partition that have the additional property that (for any k) the sum of probabilities of rectangles154
(ui, ui+1] × (vi, vi+1] with ui+1 ≤ uk is equal to uk, and similarly, the sum of all probabilities of155
rectangles (ui, ui+1]× (vi, vi+1] with vi+1 ≤ vk is equal to vk. For a general introduction to copula156
theory, see Nelsen [31],Joe [6] and Durante and Sempi [3]. However, note that most theory is on157
continuous copulas with marginals being continuous uniform distributions. For an overview on elic-158
itation methods for copulas, see Werner et al. [10].159
160
Proposition 1. Suppose we are given values u0 = 0 < u1 < · · · < un < 1 = un+1, and v0 =161
0 < v1 < · · · < vm < 1 = vm+1 (where n,m > 0), 0 < p, q < 1, with p different to the ui and q162
different to the vj. Then a copula distribution on QP (u, v) can be refined to a copula distribution163
on QP (u, v; p, q).164
The proof of proposition 1 is found in the Appendix.165
Having shown that we can always refine a copula distribution as above, we now wish to establish166
the possible range of values that can be taken by the rectangle (p, 1]× (q, 1] in a refined copula dis-167
tribution. That is, we depart from the specific copula refinement defined in the Proof of Proposition168
1, and ask what range of values can be allocated as the probability of (p, 1]× (q, 1] in some copula169
refinement.170
Suppose that i and j are chosen such that ui is the largest of the u-quantiles that is smaller than p,171
and vj is the largest of the v-quantiles that is smaller than q (this includes the possibility that ui or172
vj is 0, or that ui+1 or vj+1 is 1). Define ũ1 = ui, ũ2 = ui+1, ṽ1 = vj and ṽ2 = vj+1. The quantile173
7






























































































Figure 3: Maximum case of 16 partitions (right) resulting from partitioning 9 rectangles (left).
partition QP (ũ, ṽ) is a merging of QP (u, v), and we can merge the copula distribution on QP (u, v)174
to get one on QP (ũ, ṽ).175
Furthermore QP (ũ, ṽ; p, q) is a merging of QP (u, v; p, q). Note that QP (ũ, ṽ) has at most 9 rectan-176
gles and that QP (ũ, ṽ; p, q) has at most 16 rectangles - see Figure 3.177
For convenience we shall now consider only the case of 16 rectangles, which occurs when ui, vj 6= 0178
and ui+1, vj+1 6= 1, as shown on the right of Figure 3. Other cases are simplifications of the one we179
consider here and can be dealt with in the same way.180
We label the 16 rectangles of QP (ũ, ṽ; p, q) as R11, . . . , R44 as shown in the right hand of Figure 3.181
The 9 rectangles of QP (ũ, ṽ) are labelled as R̃11, . . . , R̃3,3 as shown in the left hand of Figure 3.
Clearly R11, . . . , R4,4 are each unions of rectangles in QP (u, v), and furthermore,
R12 ∪R13 = R̃12
R42 ∪R43 = R̃32
R21 ∪R31 = R̃21
R24 ∪R34 = R̃23
R22 ∪R23 ∪R33 ∪R32 = R̃22.
Suppose we are given a copula distribution on QP (ũ, ṽ), for which p̃st is the probability of R̃st182
(s, t = 1, 2, 3). We wish to assign copula probabilities pst to the rectangles Rst (s, t = 1, 2, 3, 4) so183
that the new distribution merges to p on QP (ũ, ṽ).184
For the merging we simply require,185
• for the corner rectangles of QP (ũ, ṽ): p11 = p̃11, p14 = p̃13, p41 = p̃31, p44 = p̃33,186
8






























































• for the central rectangle in QP (ũ, ṽ): p22 + p32 + p23 + p33 = p̃22,187
• for the remaining rectangles
p12 + p13 = p̃12
p42 + p43 = p̃32
p21 + p31 = p̃21
p24 + p34 = p̃23.
To ensure that the new distribution is a copula we also need to impose two constraints corresponding
to a row and a column:
p21 + p22 + p23 + p24 = p− ũ1
p12 + p22 + p32 + p42 = q − ṽ1.
(Note that these constraints correspond to row 2 and column 2 of the right hand of Figure 3. We
could also have specified similar constraints on row 3 and column 3, but it straightforward to see
that these are redundant).
Now define,
f(p11, ..., p44) = p33 + p43 + p34 + p44
to be the total probability in the square (p, 1]× (q, 1]. This in a linear function of the pst and we are188
free to choose it to take any value subject to the constraints listed above. As all these are linear,189
we immediately see that we have the form of a linear programming problem, and so the range of190
allowable values is an interval whose maximum and minimum values can be found be solving 2 LP191
problems. The cases in which QP (ũ, ṽ; p, q) has fewer than 16 rectangles work similarly. The above192
discussion (with minor adaptations to the other cases by removing further redundant constraints)193
can be summarized in the following Proposition:194
Proposition 2. The range of feasible values for the probability of (p, 1] × (q, 1] in any copula
refinement of the copula distribution on QP (ũ, ṽ) is given by the interval:
[min f,max f ] ,
given the corresponding constraint sets.195
We can obtain min f and max f by solving feasible LP problems with at most 12 variables and 9196
constraints.197
9






























































This now allows us to construct an algorithm for assessing copulas with expert judgements for
quantile exceedance probabilities of the form:
P (Y > yq|X > xp)
where xp and yq index the p
th and qth quantile for X and Y accordingly. For example, p = 0.5198
and q = 0.5 correspond to the medians of X and Y . Other distribution areas can then be derived.199
Given a number of such coherent elicitations at quantile pairs (u1, v1), . . . , (un, vn) we can calculate200
the copula distribution on the copula partition QP (u, v).201
For a new quantile pair (p, q), we then solve the LP problem to obtain the exact feasible range for202
the probability of (p, 1]× (q, 1]. Note that this does not fully specify the distribution on all elements203
of the refined partition QP (u, v; p, q). To achieve this, either204
(a) we can carry out further elicitations at corner points in QP (u, v; p, q) using proposition 2205
repeatedly for obtaining feasible ranges from the expert; or206
(b) we can make assumptions, such as minimally informative probabilities to restrict the number207
of elicitations required.208
In the next section, we give a simple example of making assessments in the tail of the distribution209
along the lines of (a) but carried out in a slightly different order as there are few constraints in this210
case.211
2.2 Commonly assessed quantile partition sequences212
After having presented the mathematical set-up of refined partitioning generally, we now discuss213
some partitions that might be commonly assessed in practice.214
One recurrent way of refining a joint distribution’s assessments is by sequentially choosing a quantile215
for p and/or q that is always either higher or lower than any previously assessed value. Then, we216
elicit the corresponding area above a previously elicited quantile for a new maximum or below it for217
a new minimum. Such sequences assess in particular the distribution tails more explicitly.218
Alternatively, it is (also) possible in our method to elicit probabilities of specific values, e.g. for219
1, 10, . . . , 100 (units of elicited variable) rather than common quantiles, such as the median, if this220
can increase intuitiveness in particular for more extreme parts in the distribution tails. This relates221
to the choice of whether to frame the elicitation question in terms of quantiles or values. Both have222
been suggested (as P- and V-methods) since the pioneering probability elicitations by the Stanford223
Research Institute in the 1970s [32]. While a more recent discussion on this choice is given in [33],224
we consider in the following the elicitation of quantiles.225
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Figure 4: Example of a quantile partition for assessing the upper tail.
Figure 4 illustrates a sequence of quantile partitions on the upper tail constructed through setting226
new quantile maxima in (ii) to (iv) following an initial assessment (i) (note that this carries out the227
option (a) described in the previous section). We consider the procedure of Figure 4, i.e. further228
partitioning that probability mass which has been assessed directly in step (i) as most intuitive and229
practically useful. Nevertheless, the initial assessment also determines the probability mass in areas230
of the joint distribution which are not assessed further, P (Y > yq|X ≤ xp), P (Y ≤ yq|X > xp) and231
P (Y ≤ yq|X ≤ xp), meaning we can also use a similar procedure to refine these.232
First (in (i)), we elicit an overall probability mass and then subsequently refine the assessment.233
Suppose we first elicit P (Y > y0.5|X > x0.5).234
Following (i), we elicit a refined quantile partition as determined by a new xp in (ii). A common235
choice here might be the 90th or 95th quantile in order to assess the probability mass in the joint236
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pui ui+1 = 1
Figure 5: Quantile partition of the joint distribution from (i) to (iv).
distribution’s extreme (tail) region. Thus, we elicit for instance P (Y > y0.5|X > x0.95). In the237
illustrative case-study of Section 4, we use a scenario mapping method [34] prior to the elicitations238
in order to gauge experts’ familiarity with such tail judgements and decide on a quantile for which239
experts are comfortable to make assessments.240
In (iii), we condition on Y and the new yq is chosen to assess the tail region. With xp being241
the median, we thus elicit P (X > x0.5|Y > y0.95). Depending on the underlying meaning of the242
variables and knowledge about causal or probabilistic relationships (see e.g. Rottman and Hastie243
[35], Werner et al. [11]), the expert might find it easier to condition on one variable rather than the244
other. Our method is flexible enough to allow for this.245
In the last step of this quantile partition sequence, experts assess either P (Y > y0.95|X > x0.95) or246
P (X > x0.95|Y > y0.95), depending on case-specific interest, whereas p and q are the ones from the247
previous two rounds. Thus we further explore the joint tail region. Figure 5 displays the refinement248
in the quantile partition from the first to the latest assessment.249
The assessments’ feasibility ranges are as follows. The assessment in (i) is unrestricted, meaning
experts can assess any value between [0, 1]. If the expert believes the variables are independent, the
assessment is equal to P (Y > yq), that is learning about X does not change experts’ belief. For
negative dependence, the assessment is between [0, P (Y > yq)) and for positive dependence, it is
within (P (Y > yq), 1].
All following assessments on the other hand are restricted and only feasible if the assessed value falls
within the range which is determined by solving the LP problem of minimising and maximising the
possible values of the assessed area subject to the constraints that any new partition simply adds
up to their previous assessments (see medium and dark grey areas P̃k in Figure 2) while areas which
12






























































have not been newly partitioned do not change (see light grey areas P̃k in Figure 2). Consider for
example the assessment in (iv). It is only feasible within the range that is determined by solving










p13 + p12 = p̃12 (2.1.2)
p23 + p22 + p33 + p32 = p̃22 (2.1.3)
p11 = p̃11 (2.1.4)
and251
p21 + p31 = p̃21 (2.1.5)
Experts express negative dependence again through a judgement close or equal to the lower252
bound, positive dependence is expressed by judgements close or equal to the upper bound and inde-253
pendence is assessed as before. As the upper and/or lower bounds deviate from the standard range254
of [0, 1], it is necessary to communicate these restricted feasibility bounds to an expert and explain255
their interpretation.256
The procedure for assessments (ii) to (iv) is repeated as often as necessary (with appropriate mod-257
ifications) to obtain a desired level of detail (see assessments (v) to (vii) in Figure 6 for the next258
round of three assessments). Having assessed previously the 90th or the 95th quantile of X and Y ,259
we now might consider the 99th quantile. This allows for ”zooming in” on the joint distribution’s260
tail even further.261
The resulting quantile partitions are illustrated in Figure 7.262
While this section presents an example with a focus on refining the upper distribution tail,263
remember that the generality of the method (as introduced in Section 2.1) allows for any further264
refinement of the distribution, such as for instance shown in Figure 2 (on the right).265
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Figure 7: Resulting quantile partitions after further refining the previous assessments.
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3 MODELLING THE FORM OF DIRECTLY AND INDI-
RECTLY ASSESSED PROBABILITY MASSES THROUGH
MINIMUM INFORMATION
After having presented the elicitation procedure, which allows for feasibly assessing the probability266
mass within any part of the joint distribution, in this section we outline how we model the form of267
directly and indirectly assessed parts as minimally informative.268
The reason for a minimum information approach is to address the modelling issue of underspec-269
ification. We do not have enough information for choosing a distribution that fits the experts’270
assessments uniquely but we wish to find the simplest distribution that matches them. This ap-271
proach allows us to derive a unique distribution regardless the quantile partition’s level of detail.272
As such, it does not restrict the flexibility of the assessment procedure from section 2.273
Formally, we aim for modelling dependence through that copula which is chosen to have minimum274
information (also called Kullback-Leibler divergence [36]) with respect to the uniform copula given275
the quantile constraints. The resulting distribution is considered the most independent copula sat-276
isfying the constraints.277
Consider the joint distribution g(x, y) with marginal densities g1(x) and g2(y). Whenever g1 and278
g2 are not independent, i.e. g(x, y) 6= g1(x)g2(y), we need to model the dependence between them.279
To do so, we introduce the concept of relative information I(g;h) which is a measure of similarity280









Whenever g(x) = h(x), it follows that I(g;h) = 0. A higher value of I(g1; g2) corresponds to less282
similarity. We consider h(x) a background distribution, commonly chosen as uniform or log-uniform.283
Alternatively, we use sensitivity analysis for selecting an appropriate form [19]. Together with the284
constraints, this choice determines the form of g(x) in absence of further information [23].285
Information is invariant under monotone transformations. Therefore, if cg and ch are copula den-286
sities associated with the previous densities g and h, we have I(cg; ch) = I(g;h). In particular if h287
is the joint independent distribution with the same marginals as g (g1 and g2), so that h = g1g2288
then I(g; g1g2) = I(c;uniform) where h is the uniform copula. This gives the interpretation of our289
minimum information copula as the most independent copula given the constraints.290
See Bedford and Wilson [37] for a detailed derivation on how a minimum information distribution291
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can be approximated by the equivalent distribution of maximum entropy3 [39].292
For an extensive discussion on obtaining a minimum information copula through the convex optimi-293
sation problem, we refer to [23, 37, 19]. Here, it suffices to say that the conditional density within294
each rectangle is uniform. As discussed in Section 2, when we stop eliciting information from ex-295
perts, some rectangles’ density has been directly assessed by an expert while for other rectangles the296
mass is given indirectly through related assessment and the marginals. In order to obtain a unique297
solution for the whole distribution, we hence need to solve the minimisation problem of equation298
for directly and indirectly assessed parts.299
We refer to Bedford and Wilson [37] and Meeuwissen and Bedford [21] for the corresponding proofs300
that such a minimum information distribution exists and is unique. Furthermore, Bedford et al. [19]301
and Bickel and Smith [28] discuss and apply a Lagrangian dual for a minimum information problem302
to show a way for obtaining more insight on the optimal solution.303
4 AN ILLUSTRATIVE CASE-STUDY: ASSESSING SPA-
TIAL DEPENDENCE OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE/ TER-
RORISM RISK IN INSURANCE UNDERWRITING
Given the flexibility and detail that the SRP method allows for when modelling dependence, we304
regard it as of particular interest for application areas in which common simplifying assumptions,305
such as bivariate normality, are not justified. Rather, different kinds of tail dependencies which306
potentially induce extreme impact scenarios are prevalent. For these, we often assess and model307
upper and lower tail dependence exclusively (similarly to testing the goodness of fit for asymmetric,308
Archimedean copulas to historical data when available) given that e.g. joint large losses are typically309
not observed together with joint large gains[40, 41].310
As such, we consider (re-)insurance as an industry in which rigorous dependence modelling ap-311
proaches are of particular interest. Due to the increasing complexity of (re-)insurance products,312
new (holistic) modelling approaches, such as dynamic financial analysis (DFA) (a Monte Carlo313
simulation-based method to model risks jointly), have become popular among actuaries to better314
understand the risks an insurer underwrites [9]. For these new approaches, flexible and detailed315
assessments of dependencies under a specific probability model are required. Exemplary for a DFA316
application, Eling and Toplek [42] present how various parametric copulas can be used for stress-317
testing an insurer’s risk management strategies together with the implication on stakeholders, such318
3In the context of expert judgement, an invariance approach to encoding information probabilistically is considered
a main justification for maximum entropy methods North [38].
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as regulators and rating agencies. The DFA model inputs, the perils (or risks) covered by an in-319
surer, are informed by a catastrophe model. The components of catastrophe models are a hazard,320
inventory, vulnerability and loss estimation module. The loss estimation output is usually an ex-321
ceedance probability curve specifying probabilistically the severity levels of a certain hazard in a322
region. Capturing relevant dependencies between severity levels is crucial for a more robust output.323
See Grossi and Kunreuther [43] for an introduction to catastrophe models.324
We have already established that a common challenge is lacking relevant historical data for quantify-325
ing dependence relationships serving as model input. In actuarial risk assessment, non-life insurance326
underwriting is particularly challenged. So called low frequency-high severity perils, natural and327
man-made, are by definition not frequently observed but cannot be ignored. Therefore, we require328
structured expert judgement to model their uncertainty. In this illustrative case-study, we apply329
the SRP method to elicit and model the spatial dependence of the man-made peril of terrorism.330
Terrorism attacks are not only often low frequency-high severity catastrophes but pose an additional331
challenge due to intelligent adversaries which further inhibit the use of historical data. Better un-332
derstanding the dependence between terrorism attacks’ frequencies in different regions globally is333
nevertheless key for an insurer to quantify and price this peril’s risk when managing a portfolio of334
(global) clients4.335
4.1 Pricing terrorism risk in insurance336
Traditionally, pricing of terrorism risk in insurance has not been evaluated from actuarial principles,337
but rather covered by the balance of supply and demand in the insurance market together with some338
less formal risk selection from site surveys [44]. Terrorism coverage (e.g. in the United States) had339
been included in standard commercial insurance policies as an unnamed peril on all-risk commercial340
and home owners coverages for property and contents [45]. More recent loss developments though341
have highlighted the necessity of treating its risk assessment more rigorously. A major turning342
point for dealing with terrorism risk in insurance was the attacks of September 11th, 2001 (9/11)343
on the United States. The attacks incurred an estimated monetary loss up to 60 billion US dol-344
lars, distributed among various lines of business, such as property insurance, business interruption345
insurance and workers’ compensation [46]. Globally, the worst 15 terrorist attacks in terms of casu-346
alty numbers have occurred since 1982 with many more near-miss events [45]. Mathematically, the347
relationship between the frequency of more recent attacks and their severity can be described by a348
power law, i.e. attack severities that are orders of magnitude larger than the mean can be common349
4As Woo [44] emphasises, we must not confuse quantifying terrorism risk with predicting a next attack. This is
similar to natural catastrophes, such as earthquakes, for which we cannot determine the time, location and severity
of the next event, but the aim is rather to evaluate the annual exceedance probability of loss, for instance to inform
a property insurance portfolio.
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[47]. The changing nature of its risk through an increasing number of frequencies and severities in350
multiple regions globally underlines the urgent need for improved assessment.351
4.2 Expert judgement for adversarial risk352
A specific aspect of assessing terrorism risk is the role of intelligent adversaries. Their impact is thus353
included in recent discussions on risk definitions [48, 49, 50, 51]. In fact, 9/11 led many researchers354
to propose modified risk definitions [52]. For instance, the triplet definition by Kaplan and Garrick355
[53] is extended to include adversaries in Garrick et al. [54] and Garrick [55] by considering the356
likelihood of a hazard as the conditional probability of a successful attack given that an attack is357
planned.358
Models addressing adversarial risk are typically of game-theoretic nature [56, 57, 58] whereas the359
area of adversarial risk analysis comprises decision-analytic approaches combining traditional prob-360
abilistic risk analysis (PRA) methods with game theory [59, 60, 61, 62]. Nevertheless, there is some361
debate on (traditional) PRA’s effectiveness for adversarial problems (see Ezell et al. [56] defending362
its usefulness and Brown and Cox Jr [63] and Cox Jr [64] arguing against it). A main argument363
against PRA approaches for adversaries is the dynamic attacker’s decision rule for choosing a target364
as this choice might be based on the anticipated defender’s assessment of targets’ likelihoods. In365
other words, a defender’s PRA might inform the attacker’s choice and hence override its purpose366
as the previously most likely target has now zero probability of being attacked (closely related in367
terrorism risk analysis are decision on allocating defensive resources Bier [65]). Experts quantifying368
adversarial risk should therefore decompose their judgement in accordance with adversarial risk defi-369
nitions, so that we understand experts’ beliefs about attackers’ choices. When doing so, assessments370
of an attack choice might be based on attackers’ motivations, resources and capabilities together371
with defenders’ vulnerabilities. In that way, expert judgement is used in the Probabilistic Terrorism372
Model by Risk Management Solutions Inc. (RMS5) for assessing likelihoods on target selection, ca-373
pabilities of attack modes and an attack’s overall likelihood. However, dependence between targets374
is neglected [66]. In other approaches, event trees are used to reason from an attacker’s capabili-375
ties through a defender’s countermeasures [67, 68]. In addition, several qualitative approaches for376
structuring the available knowledge on terrorists’ objectives and motivations exist in the risk and377
decision analysis literature [69, 70, 54].378
5RMS, founded at Stanford University in 1989, provides services in the area of catastrophe modelling for (re-
)insurers.
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4.3 Expert judgement for spatial dependence of terrorism attacks379
Knowledge and beliefs on terrorists’ motivations, resources and capabilities together with defender’s380
vulnerabilities inform experts directly about the spatial dependence between attack frequencies.381
Terrorist groups, such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Basque Separatist Group (ETA) or as382
well Hamas and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), had and have specific geographical383
foci with a politically motivated attack purpose. Their goals are formulated and self-proclaimed as384
separatism or liberation. The attacks’ geographical impact is identified straightforwardly. Based385
on the number of active terrorist groups per region plus their resources and capabilities relative to386
counter-measures, an expert assesses either positive or negative dependence. While positive depen-387
dence might not seem intuitive at first due to different local foci and typically a lack of collaboration388
between these groups, learning and encouragement by another groups’ successes can still occur.389
Woo [71] regards learning of optimal behaviours beyond the own organisation as a main strength of390
some well-known terrorist groups. Other scenarios for positive dependence can be due to defenders’391
collaboration, joint counter-terrorism activities and sharing of intelligence resources.392
In contrast to terrorists motivated by self-proclaimed liberatism and separatism, other groups de-393
rive their goals from religious ideology. These groups are often globally active. Their members are394
organised as multiple independent hubs with satellite cells. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State of Iraq395
and Syria/the Levant (ISIS/ISIL) are typical examples of such network-based organisations [44, 72].396
Models from swarm intelligence and statistical network analyses are used to evaluate the effective-397
ness of counter-terrorism measures and understand the attackers’ capabilities. It is understood that398
organisations like Al-Qaeda and ISIS/ISIL are more resilient and capable of more severe attacks399
than (hierarchical) army-like structured groups [71]. For dependence assessments, understanding400
the global presence of members and sympathisers (potentially future recruits) together with the401
functioning of the network structure is crucial. For instance, scenarios of positive dependence can402
occur when a terrorist group obtains more power and resources to extend globally or when new403
attack types are used for which little intelligence or counter-measures exists. Scenarios of negative404
dependence might describe attackers’ scarce resources, e.g. lacking financial support for regional405
hubs, so the target focus shifts towards a certain region. The latter also depends on vulnerabilities406
of target countries, desired attention through media or as well a planned revenge, e.g. for a country’s407
military actions.408
While these are only brief considerations for scenarios that can influence the assessment of depen-409
dence between the number of terrorist attacks in different regions (see Woo [71] for a more extensive410
discussion on regional and global terrorism), it shows the complexity of factors to be thought of. In411
this illustrative case-study, we focus on the geographical regions of Central Asia (CA) and Western412
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Figure 8: Regions of interest for dependence assessment.
Europe (WE) which are shown in Figure 8 (see the Appendix for a full list of the countries included413
per region).414
4.4 Eliciting the marginal probabilities415
Before eliciting dependence assessments from experts, we need to specify the marginal distributions416
for the variables of interest. Otherwise, the experts condition their judgements on different marginal417
probabilities and their assessments cannot be sensibly aggregated. The specification is done either418
through historical data (if available) or another, prior elicitation with a structured expert judgement419
method for univariate uncertainty, such as Quigley et al. [73], Gosling [74], Hanea et al. [75]. A420
structured elicitation for the marginal distributions is also encouraged when eliciting dependence421
only from one expert, i.e. without aggregation, as this mitigates potential biases of the marginals422
and ensures transparency[11].423
In our case-study, the marginal distributions have been assessed by 16 experts6. The experts are424
involved in analysing and pricing the peril of terrorism and other armed conflict categories. They425
work for different (re-)insurers, catastrophe modellers and related service providers. The elicitation426
session was organised as part of the European Cooperation in Science and Technology, COST Action427
IS1304 - Expert Judgement Network, which aims at stimulating the emergence and spread of high428
quality evidence-based decision support approaches through structured expert judgement methods.429
The marginal distributions FX(x) and FY (y) are defined as the number of terrorist attacks in Central430
Asia (x) and in Western Europe (y), both in 2017. We define a terrorist attack in accordance with431
common global data-bases on the topic (see START [76]). Thus, for an attack to be recorded as432
6The 16 experts are from a first elicitation round from a currently ongoing study that aims to include more experts.
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such there must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or convey some other message to433
a larger audience (or audiences) than the immediate victims. In this regard, any perpetrator group,434
any weapon type (e.g. biological, chemical, explosive, firearms etc.), any attack type (e.g. armed435
assault, bombing, facility/infrastructure attack, hostage taking etc.), any target apart from private436
persons (i.e. business, infrastructure, military, educational/religious institutions etc.) is included.437
We elicited FX(x) and FY (y) through the so called Classical Model [73, 77]. Experts provide438
various quantile assessments for a continuous quantity rather than point estimates. Usually (and439
in our case), we elicit the 5th, 50th and 95th quantile. The experts answer two types of questions.440
The first questions are about so called seed or calibration variables. For these, the true value is441
known to the analyst but not the experts at the time of the elicitation (or they will be known later442
and within the time frame of the study). The second question type is about the actual target value443
or variable of interest, i.e. the uncertainties we intend to include in the model. Based on each444
expert’s assessments of the seed variables, the experts are aggregated. For that, two performance445
measures are derived, the calibration and information score. Loosely, the calibration score measures446
the statistical accuracy of the experts whose assessments are treated as statistical hypotheses. The447
information score measures the assessments’ concentrations relative to a background distribution.448
Good expertise is shown by a high calibration and information score (see Cooke [77] for a more449
detailed introduction). Figure 9 shows each experts’ individual assessment for the target variables’450
marginal distributions together with the aggregated assessments of equal weighting (EW) and the451
classical method (DM global).452
We observe in Figure 9 that the marginal distribution assessments are similar for both regions453
whereas most of the experts provide narrow uncertainty bounds. The experts who are more uncertain454
are so for both assessments. Hence, the performance-based and the equally weighted combination455
show no major difference for either region. As commonly observed with the classical method, the456
performance-based aggregation is more informative even if both combinations lead to similar median457
assessments. The full documentation, the elicitation protocol together with results and raw data for458
the above elicitation can be found in Werner [78].459
4.5 Applying the SRP method for quantifying spatial dependence of ter-460
rorism risk461
Once the marginal distributions had been elicited, we proceeded with eliciting and modelling depen-462
dence through the SRP method. This elicitation was done with a single expert who is a professional463
in the area of terrorism catastrophe modelling within (re-)insurance (as well) and who subscribed to464
the aggregated results for the marginal distributions. In total, we elicited six dependence judgements465
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Figure 9: Outcome of eliciting the marginal distribution for each region.
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Table I: Overview of dependence elicitation procedure and results.
Framing ”Given that we observe [. . . ]” Conditional Probability Assessment
(i)
”[. . . ] more than 73 terrorist attacks in CA, what is your prob-
ability that we observe more than 62 terrorist attacks in WE?” P (Y > y0.5|X > x0.5) 0.5
(ii)
”[. . . ] more than 199 terrorist attacks in CA, what is your prob-
ability that we observe more than 62 terrorist attacks in WE?” P (Y > y0.5|X > x0.95) 0.03
(iii)
”[. . . ] more than 197 terrorist attacks in WE, what is your prob-
ability that we observe more than 73 terrorist attacks in CA?” P (X > x0.5|Y > y0.95) 0.045
(iv)
”[. . . ] more than 199 terrorist attacks in CA, what is your prob-
ability that we observe more than 197 terrorist attacks in WE?” P (Y > y0.95|X > x0.95) 0.025
(v)
”[. . . ] more than 199 terrorist attacks in CA, what is your prob-
ability that we observe more than 225 terrorist attacks in WE?” P (Y > y0.99|X > x0.95) 0.04
(vi)
”[. . . ] more than 225 terrorist attacks in WE, what is your prob-
ability that we observe more than 199 terrorist attacks in CA?” P (X > x0.95|Y > y0.99) 0.01
Figure 10: The experts joint distribution: overall (left) and assessed upper quadrant (right).
in addition to one further marginal assessment. The latter was required as we had not considered466
the 99th quantiles previously. As outlined in the initial exemplary procedure of section 2.2, we467
started by first eliciting an overall probability mass which was later partitioned to further explore468
the joint upper distribution tail. The first elicitation is therefore on the probability of the terrorist469
attack frequency in Western Europe (y) being above its 50th quantile, 62 attacks, given that we470
observe more than 73 attacks in Central Asia (x) (again the corresponding 50th quantile), both471
in the year 2017. All judgements were conditional probabilities given the expert’s familiarity with472
its interpretation. Table I summarises the dependence assessments by showing the results together473
with the framing of the questions.474
As second part of the SRP method, we then modelled the overall joint distribution for the spatial475
dependence through solving the minimum information minimisation problem (section 3) based on476
the above assessments. The result can be seen in Figure 10.477
We see that the expert’s distribution indicates a slight negative dependence relationship be-478
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tween the spatial terrorism risk of both regions which is however close to independence. This is479
particularly driven by the first assessment being equal to 0.5 which indicates independence for a480
broad area of the joint distribution. In more detail, the difference between assessment ii.) and iii.)481
shows that in the joint tail, the expert assesses that an extreme year in terms of number of attacks482
for WE affects CA more than vice versa. The slight negative dependence (close to independence)483
corresponds to the expert’s rationale which has been formally facilitated in order to support the484
expert with structuring his/her knowledge about the spatial dependence between both regions. For485
that, we used a conditional scenario mapping method [34]. In addition to mitigating some prevalent486
cognitive fallacies of assessing dependence, such as the confusion of the inverse or confusing joint487
and conditional probabilities(see also Werner et al. [11] for an overview), this method allows for488
considering and reflecting explicitly which scenarios affect the probability spaces of both regions (in489
a conditional sense). Scenarios are defined as ”sequences that link triggering events to specified con-490
sequences (or final states) through intermediate conditions” [34]. For the example shown in Figure491
11, the expert first reasoned through backwards logic, i.e. starting from the specified consequence,492
about observing more than 199 in Central Asia until the end of 2017 (α5). Then, based on the493
initiating events that might cause Central Asia to experience more than 199 attacks and which are494
(at least partly) observable today, the expert reasoned (in forward logic) how these same initiating495
events affect the development of the number of terrorist attacks in Western Europe until the end of496
2017. Based on the the number and plausibility of these conditional scenarios causing more than 255497
attacks (again α5), the expert could then make a dependence assessment in a more informed and498
confident manner. Werner et al. [34] presents the structured process of generating such conditional499
scenarios in more detail.500
As can be seen in Figure 11, the expert considers both regions to be slightly negatively dependent501
(close to independence) due to the consideration that the active terrorist groups in both regions are502
different. In Central Asia, local separatists have political and regional motivations while in Western503
Europe mainly islamist groups are prevalent despite e.g. Russia’s military involvement in the Middle504
East. Furthermore, the expert considers both regions to be different with regards to their vulnera-505
bility given not only the types of active terrorist groups but also the varying counter-terrorism and506
intelligence capabilities which drive the negative dependence relationship.507
Before concluding this illustrative example, a first remark is that for quantifying the spatial depen-508
dence of terrorism attacks the definition used in this example is rather broad by including all attack509
types. Thus, the consideration of specific attack types might have very particular effects on the510
geographical interdependencies. As such, of growing interest in the adversarial risk literature have511
been biological attacks [56] and cyber attacks [79]. For these, it can be informative to assess the512
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dependence between variables of interest, such as casualties or monetary losses.513
Further, we understand that an elicitation considering more explicitly the geographical interdepen-514
dencies of critical infrastructure can be informative for insurers, for instance when offering business515
interruption coverage. Our method could hence build upon some modelling approaches that have516
ranked the susceptibility of critical infrastructures targeted by attacks [80].517
Lastly, we acknowledge the inherent difficulties particular when considering attacks, such as 9/11,518
which some might title ”black swans”. For dependencies, the term ”perfect storms” appeared (see519
Paté-Cornell [81] for a discussion on the use of these terms in risk analysis and management).520
However, even for such events, structured assessment through experts can be informative and it is521
interesting that e.g. Zelikow (as director of the 9/11 Commission) called the misreading of precur-522
sors to these events as ”failure of imagination” given that air-planes had been used before as weapon523
and the World Trade Center in New York had been targeted already in 1993 [81].524
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
When using expert judgement for assessing dependence, there is a trade-off between easing the525
assessment burden for experts and sufficiently capturing a real-world phenomenon of interest in our526
model [10]. Therefore, we have presented an elicitation method that aims to satisfy a decision-527
maker’s desired level of detail for a model whereas the procedure for eliciting dependence from528
experts provides an intuitive way of assessing even detailed dependence information (such as extreme529
parts of a joint distribution) while avoiding infeasible and inconsistent assessments. We argued that530
for the decision-maker a non-parametric setting of modelling multivariate uncertainties is more531
desirable and therefore we addressed the potential assessment issues of under- and overspecification.532
Concluding on the application shown in this paper, we note that in future research more applications533
are desirable to explore how the SRP method performs and obtain insights on potential modifications534
like alternative ways of framing the judgements, the implication of restricted feasibility ranges, or the535
elicitation of different forms (other than conditional probabilities). For example, as an alternative536
to eliciting quantile-based assessments, we can elicit conditional expectations. This follows from the537
discussion of Werner et al. [10] on modelling and elicitation strategies that are determined by the538
choice of considering influencing factors of dependence relationships explicitly or implicitly. The539
latter is similar to PI methods which aim at satisfying reasonable conditions of a model output due540
to its easier understanding and quantification. This is of particular interest when we cannot observe541
(and hence elicit) our variables of interest directly. Bedford et al. [19] show an elicitation procedure542
and minimum information modelling method for expectations on the whole joint distribution. Hence,543
considering its elaboration based on our method could allow for a more detailed specification of544
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multivariate uncertainty for non-observable model input parameters. In the actuarial context of545
section 4, we might ask experts to assess the conditional expectation for a risk measure, such as546
probable maximum loss (see Grossi and Kunreuther [43]), which can be used (partly) as model547
output, whereas we assess dependence through PI on the function generating it. Similarly, our548
method can be used, either through quantile-based assessments or modifications, in other sectors549
in which understanding and quantifying tail risk is becoming of growing interest, such as financial550
decision-making on asset allocation [82].551
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APPENDIX
Proof for Proposition 1:552
Suppose we are given values u0 = 0 < u1 < · · · < un < 1 = un+1, and v0 = 0 < v1 < · · · < vm <553
1 = vm+1 (where n,m > 0), 0 < p, q < 1, with p different to the ui and q different to the vj . Then554
a copula distribution on QP (u, v) can be refined to a copula distribution on QP (u, v; p, q).555
Proof. In order to prove proposition 1, we divide the set QP (u, v) into four subsets:556
557
1. A(p, q) has a single element which is the rectangle of QP (u, v) containing the point (p, q).558
2. U(p, q) is the set of rectangles in QP (u, v) that overlap the line v = q, except the one in559
A(p, q).560
3. V (p, q) is the set of rectangles in QP (u, v) that overlap the line u = p, except the one in561
A(p, q).562
4. B(p, q) is the set of all rectangles in QP (u, v) that are not in A(p, q), B(p, q), or V (p, q).563
Define also A∗(p, q) to be the rectangles in QP (u, v; p, q) which are sub-rectangles of A(p, q), and564
define U∗, V ∗ and B∗ similarly.565
Note that B∗(p, q) = B(p, q), that is, the rectangles in B(u, v) do not get subdivided by the lines566
u = p, v = q. Rectangles in U∗ are obtained by dividing rectangles in U by the line v = q, and567
rectangles in V ∗ are obtained by dividing rectangles in V by the line u = p.568
We now define the refined copula distribution on QP (u, v; p, q).569
Let α = (p − ui)/(ui+1 − ui), and β = (q − vj)/(vj+1 − vj). We specify how to define the refined570
copula distribution as follows:571
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=elements of V (p, q)
=elements of U(p, q)
=elements of A(p, q)
Figure 12: Different set of rectangles in QP (u, v).
1. For the rectangles in A∗ , the lower left sub-rectangle is allocated αβ of the mass of A, the572
lower right one gets proportion (1−α)β, the upper left one gets proportion α(1− β), and the573
upper right one gets proportion (1− α)(1− β).574
2. Each rectangle in U is subdivided into two sub-rectangles in U∗ by the line v = q, and the lower575
sub-rectangle is allocated proportion β of its mass and the upper sub-rectangle is allocated576
proportion (1− β) of the mass.577
3. Each rectangle in V is subdivided into two sub-rectangles in V ∗ by the line u = p, whereas the578
left sub-rectangle is allocated proportion α of its mass and the upper sub-rectangle is allocated579
proportion (1− α) of its mass.580
4. Any rectangle in B∗(p, q) = B(p, q) is assigned the same probability as it was in in the copula581
distribution on QP (u, v).582
This allocation of probabilities to the rectangles of QP (u, v; p, q) adds to 1, while it is straightforward583
to check that it is a copula distribution.584
Regions of interest in illustrative case-study (section 4):585
• Central Asia: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajik-586
istan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan.587
• Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland,588
Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United589
Kingdom.590
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